Fudging
socioeconomic data to make things appear better than they actually are in China
has long been a standard practice of its government. One could even say that manipulating data (操纵数据 [Cāozòng Shùjù]) regarding the economic and social
conditions is in the DNA of this regime.
Thus, in his extremely insightful and still very useful read on the
Chinese economy, CHINA’S GUARANTEED BUBBLE, brilliant Tsinghua University
economist Zhu Ning devotes an entire chapter entitled “Voodoo Data” to debunking
official Chinse Government economic statistics.
Skepticism about these numbers extends to top
Chinese leaders. In a private
conversation that became public, President Xi Jinping’s former Premier, LiKeqiang, frankly
declared that he did not trust the official GDP growth numbers. Li added that he instead looks at figures for
coal and electricity consumption to better gauge Chinese economic growth. In his book, Zhu notes that the official
Chinese unemployment rate in the early 2000’s remained remarkably stable, narrowly
fluctuating around 4-5%, even during downturns, like the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis. And the official
figures for the growth rate always align with the GDP growth targets in the government’s
five-year economic plans. But hey, maybe
these are Chinese economy special characteristic [中国的经济特色 (Zhōngguó de Jīngìjì
Tèsè)]!
It
comes then as no surprise that the Chinese Government has almost certainly
doctored the data on Covid 19 deaths, claiming that just 83,150 Chinese have
died during the pandemic. This very low
figure naturally raised eyebrows and was greeted skeptically outside of the
People’s Republic. Earlier this year,
the NEW YORK TIMES, with aid of
a group leading demography and public health scholars, did a deep dive into
China’s Covid numbers and possible deaths from the disease. They concluded that the official Chinese
Government Covid death figure grossly understated the actual number of
fatalities. Their modeling in the article
suggests that the number of Chinese who died from Covid could range from 1.1 up
to 1.6 million, with many of these deaths coming after December 7, 2022, when the
strict Covid Omicron lockdown was finally lifted.
Zhejiang
Province, home to 5% of China’s population and one of its most economically
dynamic provinces, reported an unusual spike in cremations registered during
the first quarter of 2023. The province
reported a 70% rise in cremations,when 170,000
occurred compared to 71,000 during the same period in the previous year. While the provincial authorities did not state
the cause of these increased deaths, the sudden surge in cremations is strongly
indicative of a spike in Covid fatalities.
The Zhejiang cremation numbers also dovetail with numerous anecdotal
reports on Chinese social of long lines of cars backed up at crematoriums at
the end of 2022 and start of 2023.
In
any case, the province’s data was quickly taken down. China has also failed to release data on
the number of cremations that took place in last quarter of 2022, the first
time in 10 years the Ministry of Civic Affairs, which manages data on this
matter, has done that.
Chinese
Government insistence on putting out a ludicrously low official Covid death
counts is rather puzzling. Even if one
assumes that 1.6 million Chinese died of Covid, China’s record in this area
still compares favorably to that of the US and other Western countries. Taking the high-end estimate of Chinese Covid
fatalities translates into 110 deaths per 100,000 people; the figure
for America is three times higher, 337 per 100,000, while those for Italy, the
UK, Spain, Germany, Israel, and Canada all exceed that of China.
This
contrast reflects China’s relative success in managing Covid during the first
two years of the pandemic. The
combination of lockdowns and quarantines directed at areas marked by infection
outbreaks, as well as mass testing, did keep death rates down and the virus
largely in check without severely damaging the economy and upsetting the lives
of ordinary people. However, the
extremely infectious Covid Omicron variant, coupled with the limitedeffectiveness of
China’s Sinovac Covid vaccine, made really draconian lockdowns involving entire
cities, including China’s economic hub, Shanghai, appear necessary.
But
these measures devastated the Chinese economy, hitting
the private sectors, especially small business in dining and retailing,
particularly hard. They also put severe
fiscal burdens on already cash-strapped local governments, who bore the high
costs of mass Covid testing and quarantining people infected with the
disease. All of that, combined with the
general impact of the extremely strict zero-Covid policy in making it very hard
for people to get on with their lives, prompted a rare outburst of popular protest
across China against the regime (protests regularly break out in China but they
are all intensely localized).
The
regime’s abrupt cancellation of zero-Covid in the face of these protests is yet
more evidence of the growing dysfunctionality of policy-making in China’s
government. The swiftness with which
this was done precluded any effort to ramp up vaccination of the elderly—when
restrictions were lifted, just 40% of Chinese above the age of 80, the
individuals most vulnerable to Covid, had received booster shots. It also led to chaos in numerous hospitals in
the first days of the reopening, as medical personnel, who had not been
informed about the surprising policy shift, fell prey to the first wave of
infections following the lifting of the lockdowns.
All
of this occurred against the backdrop of a 180 degree turn in Chinese
Government rhetoric regarding Covid.
During the fall 2022 lockdowns, officials strongly defended Covid
restrictions, saying that the disease posed a mortal threat to the country and
that people’s lives had to be defended at all costs. After the December 2022 policy reversal, Dr.
Liang Wannian, the architect of zero-Covid approach declared, without citing
any evidence to back up his claim, “The virus is much milder now.” I think that the large numbers of Chinese who
died of Covid during the first quarter of 2023 would beg to differ. Hasn’t anyone told these people about the
importance of being consistent in your messaging during crises like public
health emergencies?
I have no
idea how effectively China will confront the next inevitable post-Covid
pandemic. But one thing I am certain of
and willing to bet a month’s salary on is whatever official public health data
China’s Government puts out on it should be taken with a massive grain of
salt.
And now,
while I’m on the subject of dodgy data from China, a follow up on my last China
post dealing with youth unemployment:
In
an unusually public article published on
July 17th by the well-read and highly regarded Chinese financial
magazine, CAIXIN, Peking University associate professor of economics, Zhang
Dandan, estimates that the youth joblessness rate may be close to 50% (46.5%). That is over twice as high as the official
government rate of 21%. Even if Zhang is
somewhat off here—the CAIXIN article drew criticism in Chinese social media—her
findings indicate that the Chinese Government has yet again massaged the
figures to make things look better than they actually are. Bring on the voodoo data! Shortly after Zhang’s article appeared, China’s
internet regulator closed media accounts that posted “essays” it deemed to be
“rumors.” It also scrubbed social media
video depicting poverty, claiming that some were “staged.”
Comments
Post a Comment